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WHY AND HOW THE ISSUE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION 
MADE ITS WAY UP TO THE SUPREME COURT  
Justin Scharff* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most powerful tools an author can wield is a 
properly registered copyright.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
United States Constitution provides Congress with the power to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”1  Pursuant to its powers in the 
Constitution, Congress enacted the first copyright laws in 1790 to 
promote and protect creative works.2  Congress enacted the Copyright 
Act of 1976 to address copyright protection of creative works to keep 
up with the emergence of some of America’s greatest technological 
innovations.3  The Copyright Act not only responded to some of the 
toughest intellectual property questions,4 but it also provided 
 
* B.A. in Political Science, St. Joseph’s College, J.D. Candidate 2020, Touro College Jacob 
D. Fuchsberg Law Center. I would like to thank my family for supporting me through my 
journey in law school.  They have been there for me every step of the way, and there are not 
enough words in the dictionary to describe how appreciative I am for their unwavering support.  
I would also like to thank Editor-in-Chief, Michael Morales, for all of his help throughout this 
process.  He provided invaluable feedback and instruction throughout every draft of this Note.  
Lastly, but certainly not least, I would like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for all of her 
assistance.  Her expertise in copyright proved to be more valuable than I would have ever 
imagined.  
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:19 (Sept. ed. 2018); see also id. § 
1:45.  
3 See H.R. REP NO. 94-1476 (1976). 
4 The Copyright Act of 1976 dealt with the explosive growth of new media—television, 
phonographs, and motion pictures to name a few.  See Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856, 856 (1978).  Furthermore, these types of media 
gained the ability to be disseminated far and wide, a phenomenon that the Copyright Act of 
1909 was unable to handle.  Id.  The Copyright Act of 1976 removed some of the needless 
formalities around obtaining a copyright, which made it easier for people to copyright their 
work.  See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.01 (rev. ed. 
1
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numerous incentives for those who registered their copyrights with the 
Copyright Office.5  One of the most alluring incentives was, and still 
is, the ability to institute an action for copyright infringement.6  
However, for the purposes of bringing an infringement suit, when is a 
copyright registered? 
Under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a),7 no civil action for copyright 
infringement can be instituted until preregistration or registration of 
the copyright claim is made in accordance with the Copyright Act of 
1976.8  Although Congress mandates the registration of a copyright 
prior to a plaintiff’s bringing a copyright infringement suit, Congress, 
through several amendments to the statute, has failed to explicitly 
define when a copyright is registered.9  The courts have developed two 
conflicting approaches to determine when a copyright is registered for 
bringing copyright infringement suits.  The two approaches are the 
registration approach and the application approach. 
Proponents of the registration approach argue that registration 
of a copyright is only satisfied after the Copyright Office rules on the 
copyright application, either accepting or rejecting the application.10  
The Tenth Circuit and, more recently, the Eleventh Circuit support this 
approach.11  On the other hand, advocates of the application approach 
argue that registration is satisfied when the applicant deposits the 
appropriate materials in the Copyright Office together with the 
 
2018).  This trend of removing unnecessary formalities continued with America’s adherence 
to the Berne Convention in 1989.  See 134 CONG. REC. H.29661, 30103 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 
1988). 
5 Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides exclusive rights to those who hold a 
copyright.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).  These include the ability to reproduce the copyrighted 
material, create derivative works, distribute the copyrighted material, and publicly perform 
and display the copyrighted work.  Id. 
6 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 
7 Id. 
8 Id.  The registration requirement only applies to works created in the United States.  Id.  
Foreign works are exempt from this requirement.  Id.  See also discussion of pre-registration 
infra Part III.A. 
9 See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 13 (1988); see also Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897, 
103d Cong. (1993).  
10 See Robert Kasunic, Copyright from Inside the Box: A View from the U.S. Copyright 
Office, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 318 (2016); see also 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON 
COPYRIGHT § 17:78 (Sept. ed. 2018). 
11 See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th 
Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 
(2010); see also Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 
1339 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018). 
2
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application.12  The application approach is supported by the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits.13 
The Eleventh Circuit is the latest circuit to address the issue of 
copyright registration.  In Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-
Street.com, LLC, the plaintiff filed a copyright infringement lawsuit 
before the Copyright Office ruled on its copyright application.14  The 
court held that the statutory language of the Copyright Act made it 
clear that registration of a copyright occurs only after the Copyright 
Office affirmatively acts on the applicant’s copyright application.15  
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case was not only correct, but 
it also deepened the split between circuits.  The registration issue pitted 
two circuits against two others, creating a perfect platform for the 
United States Supreme Court’s analysis.  As a result of this split, on 
June 28, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the 
registration issue presented in Fourth Estate.16  The Supreme Court 
finally has the opportunity to resolve the issue of registration under the 
Copyright Act. 
The author will argue that the registration approach is the 
correct interpretation of the Copyright Act based on plain language, 
legislative history, and public policy.  The author predicts that the 
Supreme Court, based on the statutory language of the Copyright Act, 
will favor the registration approach and hold that in order to institute a 
civil action for copyright infringement, one must have a copyright that 
the Copyright Office has accepted or rejected.  In its analysis, the 
Supreme Court should read the applicable statutory sections in pari 
materia.17  When read in conjunction with each other, the statutes 
demonstrate Congress’s clear intent for the Copyright Office to rule on 
a copyright application before the requirements for registration are 
satisfied.  The consistent statutory language and scheme of the 
Copyright Act indicate that the Copyright Office must act 
 
12 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4; see also Brief of amicus curiae The Copyright 
Alliance in Support of Petitioner, Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (No. 17-571), 2018 WL 4252021. 
13 See Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir. 1984); see also 
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010). 
14 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1339. 
15 Id. at 1341. 
16 See Fourth Estate Pub. Ben. Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018). 
17 See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972) (stating that “the rule of in pari 
materia—like any canon of statutory construction—is a reflection of practical experience in 
the interpretation of statutes: a legislative body generally uses a particular word with a 
consistent meaning in a given context”). 
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affirmatively before a registrant is entitled to the benefits provided by 
the Copyright Act.  This view is also supported by the extensive 
legislative history of the Copyright Act.18  The registration approach 
balances Congress’s goal of creating a robust federal registry and 
ensuring that all works meet the requirements of the Copyright Act.  
This author argues that the Supreme Court should determine that 
registration is only satisfied after the Copyright Office rules on the 
copyright application.  If the Supreme Court rules otherwise, it is vital 
that Congress amend the Copyright Act to uphold the registration 
requirement.  Through amendments to the Copyright Act, Congress 
has created specific statutory rights that not only properly incentivize 
registration, but also give power and authority to the Copyright Office.  
“[I]f merely delivering the material were all that is required, the 
Copyright Office would have no need for its almost 100-person 
examining corps, which could be replaced by a few mailroom clerks 
whose duties would be limited to stamping a receipt date.”19  The 
registration requirement ensures that each copyright is examined by 
officials who specialize in copyright law and any deficiency is dealt 
with before the case reaches the court. 
This Note will examine the registration issue currently before 
the Supreme Court.  Part II will discuss the pertinent statutory sections 
that the Supreme Court will inevitably analyze to determine what 
constitutes registration for infringement purposes.  Part III will 
examine the circuit split regarding the copyright registration issue and 
the circuit courts’ reasoning for supporting either the registration 
approach or application approach.  Part IV will analyze the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Fourth Estate.  Part V will argue that the 
registration approach is the correct approach based on the plain 
language of the pertinent statutory sections discussed in Part II, 
congressional intent, legislative history, and public policy.  Finally, 
Part VI will conclude the Note and predict that the Supreme Court will 
affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s decision. 
  
 
18 See discussion of the legislative history infra Part II.A. 
19 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10. 
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II. RELEVANT STATUTORY SECTIONS FOR THE COPYRIGHT 
REGISTRATION ISSUE 
The issue of registration is fairly complex because different 
courts have used several different, yet pertinent, sections of the 
copyright statutes to support either the registration approach or 
application approach.  These statutory sections deal with copyright 
protection, the role of the Copyright Office, and the importance of 
registration.  This Part will discuss the relevant statutory sections 
surrounding copyright registration.  
A. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a): Copyright Registration Needed 
For Copyright Claims 
The statutory section at the forefront of this legal issue is 17 
U.S.C. § 411(a).  This section states: 
Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights 
of the author under section 106A(a), and subject to the 
provisions of subsection (b), no civil action for 
infringement of the copyright in any United States work 
shall be instituted until preregistration or registration 
of the copyright claim has been made in accordance 
with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit, 
application, and fee required for registration have been 
delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and 
registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to 
institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, 
with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register 
of Copyrights.20 
Although the first sentence of section 411(a) succinctly states 
that one cannot institute a civil action until preregistration or 
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with 
the title, section 411(a) fails to define the term “registration.”  This 
undefined term has created the split among the circuit courts discussed 
throughout this Note.  If the Supreme Court adopts the registration 
approach, then a copyright is registered when the Copyright Office 
examines and rules on the copyright application.  However, if the 
 
20 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
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application approach is adopted, then a suit for infringement can be 
brought as soon as an applicant deposits the required materials. 
Congress has continuously revised section 411(a) in various 
congressional sessions.21  One of these sessions, which focused on the 
potential adoption of the Berne Convention,22 dealt with the 
elimination of formalities in obtaining and enforcing copyright 
protections.23  A Senate Judiciary Committee reported that it was 
concerned that the requirements set forth in section 411(a) were 
incompatible with the goals of the Berne Convention.24  However, the 
sitting Congress ignored its report and chose to leave the registration 
requirement of section 411(a) intact.25 
Instead of removing the registration requirement entirely, the 
amendment exempted foreign works from the registration 
requirement.26  This ensured that foreign works would be protected and 
enforceable at fixation.  Critically, Congress kept in place the 
registration requirement for domestic works.27  This amendment shows 
that registration for domestic works was not a useless formality, but 
one that Congress intentionally chose to keep in place for domestic 
works.28  This is highlighted in a joint explanatory statement from 
members of Congress which stated that the amendment “reaffirm[ed] 
 
21 See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 13 (1988); see Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897, 
103d Cong. (1993). 
22 The Berne Convention is a set of international rules and regulations and is followed by 
most of the global community.  See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, art. 9(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 24, 2971 and as amended Sept. 28, 
1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force in the United States Mar. 1, 1989).  
One of the main goals of the Berne Convention was to eliminate formalities surrounding 
copyrights.  See id. 
23 One of the primary reasons behind eliminating needless formalities in the Copyright Act 
was to prevent people from losing their statutory remedies because of a draconian formality 
that had no place in modern society.  See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4. 
24 See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 14 (1988).  One goal in particular was the abolition of 
formalities throughout copyright law.  Id.  The Committee believed that the registration 
requirement was one of these formalities that needed to be removed from the Act in order to 
comply with the Berne Convention.  Id. 
25 One member of Congress reasoned that the amended bill was a compromise.  See 134 
CONG. REC. H.29661, 30103 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1988) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).  While 
many formalities would be eliminated, the registration requirement would be upheld.  Id.  
Congressman William Moorhead explained that “[the bill] create[ed] a two-tier solution to the 
registration issue.  Registration is continued as a prerequisite to suit by domestic authors.  Only 
foreign origin works are excepted from the registration requirement.”  Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 4, Art. 19
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/19
2018 WHEN IS A COPYRIGHT REGISTERED? 1325 
the importance of registration—to the public, the Library of Congress, 
the judiciary, and the copyright community—and its ongoing 
validity.”29   
B. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) and (b): Affirmative Power of 
the Copyright Office to Register or Reject a 
Copyright Application 
17 U.S.C. § 410(a), which helps flesh out the legal issue, deals 
with the affirmative power of the Copyright Office.  This section 
states: 
When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights 
determines that, in accordance with the provisions of 
this title, the material deposited constitutes 
copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal and 
formal requirements of this title have been met, the 
Register shall register the claim and issue to the 
applicant a certificate of registration under the seal of 
the Copyright Office. The certificate shall contain the 
information given in the application, together with the 
number and effective date of the registration.30 
This statutory section details the affirmative steps that the 
Copyright Office must take before it registers a copyright.  Section 
410(a) dictates that the Copyright Office shall register the claim after 
it examines the claim and the applicant deposits the appropriate 
material.31  The Copyright Office must examine the material and 
determine whether the deposited material adheres to the strict 
requirements of the Copyright Act.  After the claim is registered, the 
Copyright Office will issue a certificate of registration.32  An amicus 
brief for Authors and Educators explains it well: “If an application 
alone was needed for registration, then there would not be a need for 
defining ‘registration’ in Section 410(a) as an action after an 
examination has occurred.”33 
 
29 Id. at 30105. 
30 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2018). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Brief for Authors and Educators as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fourth 
Estate Public Ben. Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (No. 17-571), 2018 
WL 5263259, at 16. 
7
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Furthermore, this section allows the Copyright Office to act as 
a filter for the courts and effectuate judicial economy.  By examining 
each copyright application on an individual basis, the Copyright Office 
is able to weed out frivolous lawsuits that would clog up the court 
system.  The only cases that can be brought are the ones that have 
passed through the strict scrutiny of trained copyright officials.  
Additionally, 17 U.S.C. § 410(b) gives the Copyright Office 
the power to refuse registration.  This section states: 
In any case in which the Register of Copyrights 
determines that, in accordance with the provisions of 
this title, the material deposited does not constitute 
copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid 
for any other reason, the Register shall refuse 
registration and shall notify the applicant in writing of 
the reasons for such refusal.34 
The Copyright Office’s power to refuse registration highlights 
an important flaw in the application approach.  If, in accordance with 
the application approach, registration is satisfied solely by depositing 
certain materials, the power of refusal would be superfluous, rendering 
this section of the statute meaningless.  Under the application 
approach, the Copyright Office’s refusal could come months after the 
litigation started.  This would often result in a court’s not being able to 
hear the Copyright Office’s expert determination on copyrightability, 
which would not only greatly weaken the overall purpose of the 
Copyright Office, but the Copyright Act as well. 
C. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d): Effective Date of Copyright 
Registration 
17 U.S.C. § 410(d) deals with the effective date of registration.  
This section states that “[t]he effective date of a copyright registration 
is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later 
determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a court of competent 
jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all been received in 
the Copyright Office.”35 
While some courts interpret this as a statutory section that 
ignores the registration requirement set forth in sections 410(a) and 
 
34 17 U.S.C. § 410(b). 
35 Id. § 410(d). 
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411(a),36 statutes need to be read in pari materia.  Therefore, “it is not 
logical to assume that the relation-back provision [in § 410(d)] 
subsumes the explicit requirements of § 411 and § 410(a).”37  This 
statutory section is Congress’s acknowledgement and solution to 
potential bureaucratic delays by the Copyright Office.38  
D. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a): The Process of Obtaining 
Registration 
Finally, 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) provides for the requisite 
information that the Copyright Office needs for consideration of a 
copyright application.  This section states: 
At any time during the subsistence of the first term of 
copyright in any published or unpublished work in 
which the copyright was secured before January 1, 
1978, and during the subsistence of any copyright 
secured on or after that date, the owner of copyright or 
of any exclusive right in the work may obtain 
registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the 
Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, 
together with the application and fee specified by 
sections 409 and 708. Such registration is not a 
condition of copyright protection.39 
Section 408(a) instructs that the owner of a copyright may 
obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the 
Copyright Office the deposit, application, and fee.  While some courts 
claim that this statutory section supports the application approach,40 
those courts ignore the specific language of section 408(a).  The phrase 
 
36 See Forasté v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.R.I. 2003) (reasoning that “[t]he 
plain language of this statutory provision suggests that the registration occurs on the day the 
Copyright Office receives all of the necessary application materials (application, deposit, and 
fee)” (emphasis in original)). 
37 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1204 n.9.  Furthermore, this statutory scheme of retroactive 
dating can be found in other statutes.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2018) (stating that once trademark 
registration is granted, the date of registration retroactively dates back to the date of the 
application or the intent to use application). 
38 See H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 157 (1976) (explaining that 410(d) “takes account of the 
inevitable time-lag between receipt of the application and other material and the issuance of 
the certificate”). 
39 17 U.S.C. § 408(a). 
40 See Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004). 
9
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“may obtain” shows that delivery is simply another step in the process 
of obtaining registration.  If registration was satisfied on delivery, the 
language of section 408(a) would read “shall obtain.”41 
Moreover, the language in section 408(a) addresses the timing 
of protection under the Copyright Act, not the timing of enforcement.  
The statute protects any person who files an application, fee, and 
deposit.  However, the enforcement of that protection can only be 
brought after the Copyright Office responds to the application.42 
III. APPLICATION OF THE LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the registration approach for 
handling the registration issue, which requires that the Copyright 
Office rule on the copyright application before a civil action for 
copyright infringement can be instituted.43  In contrast, the Ninth and 
Fifth Circuits developed the application approach for handling the 
registration issue, which requires mere delivery of the fee, the work, 
and the application to the Copyright Office.44  In Fourth Estate, the 
Eleventh Circuit deepened this circuit split by agreeing with the Tenth 
Circuit’s registration approach.45  This Part will discuss the Tenth 
Circuit’s registration approach and the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ 
application approach. 
A. The Registration Approach 
The registration approach, which is followed by the Tenth 
Circuit and, recently, the Eleventh Circuit, relies heavily on the 
statutory text of the Copyright Act.  The registration approach requires 
that the Copyright Office rules on a copyright application before an 
 
41 Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
42 TVI, Inc. v. INFOSoft Techs., Inc., No. 4:06CV00697JCH, 2006 WL 2850356, at *4 
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2006). 
43 See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th 
Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 
(2010). 
44 See Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir. 1984); Cosmetic Ideas, 
Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010). 
45 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th 
Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (abrogating on the ground that registration is 
not a subject matter jurisdiction limitation on the court). 
10
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infringement suit can be filed.  Support for this approach can be found 
in La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire.46 
The parties in La Resolana were La Resolana Architects, PA 
(hereinafter “La Resolana”) and Angel Fire Home Design (hereinafter 
“Clay Realtors”).47  A representative from La Resolana met with a 
representative from Clay Realtors to discuss developing townhouses 
in Angel Fire, New Mexico.48  During this meeting, La Resolana 
alleged that it showed Clay Realtors architectural drawings and plans 
that La Resolana created for potential townhouses in Angel Fire; 
however, the parties were unable to come to a deal.49  A few years later, 
La Resolana noticed that a townhouse owned by Clay Realtor looked 
very similar to La Resolana’s architectural drawings, so it initiated a 
copyright infringement action against Clay Realtors.50  At the time of 
the filing of the lawsuit, La Resolana had submitted the required 
materials set forth by the Copyright Act to the Copyright Office.51  
However, the Copyright Office had not yet ruled on the application.52  
As a result, Clay Realtors moved to dismiss the case.53 
After Clay Realtors moved to dismiss but before the district 
court ruled on the motion, La Resolana submitted a letter, allegedly 
from the Copyright Office, that stated that the Copyright Office had 
registered La Resolana’s copyright.54  However, the district court ruled 
that this letter was hearsay because the letter could not be 
authenticated.55  Therefore, because there was no evidence that La 
Resolana registered its copyright, the district court reasoned that La 
Resolana failed to meet the statutory requirement of section 411(a).56  
As a result, the court dismissed La Resolana’s claim, and La Resolana 
subsequently appealed.57  
 
46 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1200. 
47 Id. at 1197. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1198. 
54 Id. at 1197. 
55 Id. at 1208. 
56 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1198. 
57 Critically, Plaintiff did not appeal the District Court’s finding that the letter was 
unauthenticated hearsay.  See id. at 1208.  This is important in understanding the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision to affirm the lower court’s decision. 
11
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The Tenth Circuit not only focused on the plain text of the 
Copyright Act, but it also interpreted its legislative history and 
analyzed public policy.58  The court noted that section 411(a) requires 
affirmative action by both the applicant and the Copyright Office: the 
applicant must deposit the required material and the Copyright Office 
must rule on the application.59  The court stated that these actions 
showed that satisfying the registration requirement is not as simple as 
merely submitting an application; the Copyright Office must examine 
the copyright application and rule before registration is satisfied.60  
However, this is not the only statutory section that requires affirmative 
action by the Copyright Office. 
The court focused on the additional affirmative actions 
required by section 410(a).61  The court explained that, under section 
410(a), the Copyright Office must examine and register the copyright 
before issuing a certificate.62  Furthermore, the court stated that similar 
language can be found in section 410(b).63  This section allows the 
Copyright Office to register the claim or refuse registration, which are 
both affirmative acts required before registration is satisfied.64 
The court also focused on the specific verb usage in section 
408(a).65  This statutory section states that an applicant may obtain 
registration after submitting all of the required material.66  If 
application was satisfied on mere application, the section would be 
written “shall obtain” instead of “may obtain.”67  This section shows 
that the application process is preliminary to the next step of 
registration.  After the material is deposited, the Copyright Office must 
register or reject the copyright application.68 
Finally, the court highlighted 17 U.S.C. § 501(b)’s statement 
that a copyright owner is entitled to the remedies in the Copyright Act, 
 
58 Id. at 1198-1208. 
59 Id. at 1200. 
60 Id. 
61 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 See discussion of § 408(a) supra Part II.D. 
67 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F. 
Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
68 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018). 
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subject to the requirements set forth in section 411(a).69  The court 
reasoned that “[t]his statutory language clearly instructs that a 
copyright owner can sue for infringement only after the copyright is 
registered, or registration is refused.”70 
After the court analyzed the statutory sections, it examined the 
two approaches to registration.71  The court first reviewed the 
registration approach, and stated that it is in good company.72  In this 
section of the opinion, it collected cases that supported the registration 
approach through the years.73  The court noted that these cases focused 
on the statutory language of the Copyright Act.74  After sifting through 
those cases, the court analyzed the application approach.75  In this 
section of the opinion, the court acknowledged the support for the 
application approach by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits as well as Nimmer 
on Copyright.76  The court then explained the basis of the application 
approach.77 
The court stated that allowing a person to initiate a copyright 
claim as soon as an application is filed could help facilitate judicial 
protection of copyrights.78  Furthermore, the application approach 
considers registration as a needless formality79 because regardless of 
 
69 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201.  The relevant portion of 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) states that  
[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is 
entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action 
for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is 
the owner of it. The court may require such owner to serve written notice 
of the action with a copy of the complaint upon any person shown, by the 
records of the Copyright Office or otherwise, to have or claim an interest 
in the copyright, and shall require that such notice be served upon any 
person whose interest is likely to be affected by a decision in the case. 
17 U.S.C. § 501(b). 
70 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201. 
71 Id. at 1203. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  The cases collected were Vacheron & Constantin–Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus 
Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958), M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 
F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D. Md. 2005), 
Robinson v. Princeton Review, Inc., 1996 WL 663880 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1996), and Loree 
Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
74 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1202. 
75 Id. at 1203. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1203-04. 
78 Id. at 1203. 
79 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1203. 
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whether registration is accepted or rejected, one can still bring a suit.80  
While the court admitted that these arguments have some appeal, the 
court ultimately reasoned that the application approach ignored the 
plain meaning of the Copyright Act as well as the legislative history.81 
The court provided three reasons for why the application 
approach’s statutory analysis is wrong.82  First, the court stated that the 
application approach requires a “topsy-turvy” reading of the Copyright 
Act.83  The Copyright Act does not confer different benefits on those 
who submit copyright applications and those whose copyrights are 
registered by the Copyright Office; these benefits are part of a single 
package.84  Second, the court reasoned that Congress created 
significant incentives to encourage registration of copyrights with the 
Copyright Office.85  Every remedy in the Copyright Act is conditioned 
on registration of the copyright.86  Finally, the court stated that the 
application approach created shifting legal entitlements.87  The court 
declared that “[i]f, for example, an applicant could obtain the 
advantage of the presumption that the copyright is valid upon 
application, see 17 U.S.C. § 408(c), but then, after examination the 
Register of Copyrights determined the material is not copyrightable, 
the presumption of validity would swing back and forth.”88  This would 
create uncertainty in the law, which is at odds with Congress’s intent 
when it enacted the Copyright Act.89 
 
80 Id. at 1203. 
81 Id. at 1204.  The court acknowledged the arguments set forth by Nimmer and other courts.  
Id.  The court further stated that there could be times when a copyright was diluted because 
the Copyright Office had not yet acted.  Id.  However, the court stated that “[w]hatever the 
practical force of this argument, we cannot ignore the plain meaning of the statute, nor change 
the legislative scheme.”  Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1204. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 501 (stating that the right to file an infringement suit is subject 
to the registration requirement of section 411); see also 17 U.S.C. § 502 (stating that a 
copyright holder can obtain an injunction); § 501 (dictating that a prevailing copyright owner 
can recover attorney’s fees).  All of these remedies are available to those who file their claim 
within the three-year statute of limitations period.  See 17 U.S.C. § 507.  While not discussed 
by the court, prompt registration is the best way to avoid any conflict with the three-year time 
limit set forth in § 507.  Id.   
87 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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However, the court did not stop there.  The court dove into the 
world of congressional amendments and sessions by focusing on the 
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,90 which is a prime 
example of Congress’s refusal to discard the vital requirement of 
affirmative action by the Copyright Office.91  The goal of the Berne 
Act was to eliminate unnecessary formalities when obtaining copyright 
protection and ally the United States with the Berne Convention.92 
While the Berne Convention Implementation Act was being 
considered, a Senate Judiciary Committee expressed concern that 
requiring registration of a copyright claim before a lawsuit could 
commence was possibly an antiquated measure.93  The Senate 
Judiciary Committee submitted a proposal to eliminate the registration 
requirement.94  However, this proposal was swiftly rejected because 
Congress intended to keep the registration requirement for domestic 
works and wanted the Copyright Office to rule on every copyright 
application.95  Instead, Congress eliminated the registration 
requirement for foreign works only.96  The court pointed out that this 
amendment is in line with the Berne Convention as the Convention 
“does not forbid its members [from] impos[ing] formalities on works 
first published in [their] own territor[ies].”97 
The court also noted that Congress took up the issue of 
eliminating the registration requirement in 1993.98  However, Congress 
once again decided to keep the stringent requirement of registration 
and rejected the proposal.99  The topic of registration came up once 
again during the 2005 amendment to the Copyright Act.  Through the 
 
90 See S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988). 
91 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205. 
92 Id.; see also Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9(2), 
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 24, 2971 and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force in the United States Mar. 1, 1989).  The Berne Convention is a 
set of international rules regarding copyright protection and enforcement, which eliminated 
most of the formalities pertaining to copyright.  See discussion of the Berne Convention supra 
Part II.A. 
93 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205. 
94 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 14. 
95 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1206. 
96 Id. at 1205. 
97 Id. at 1208 n.11 (first and second alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 
18). 
98 Id. at 1206; see also Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897, 103d Cong. (1993). 
99 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1206; see also Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897, 103d 
Cong. (1993).  
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Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005,100 Congress 
amended the Copyright Act to add preregistration to 17 U.S.C § 411.101  
Again, Congress kept in place the registration requirement of the 
Copyright Act.  The legislative history has consistently shown 
Congress’s desire to keep the registration requirement set forth in § 
411(a).  Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s granting of 
Clay Realtor’s motion to dismiss in accordance with the registration 
approach because the Copyright Office had not yet ruled on La 
Resolana’s application.102 
B. The Application Approach 
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits utilize the application approach.  
This approach focuses less on the statutory text of the Copyright Act 
and more on public policy and judicial economy.  The first case that 
supported the application approach was Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. 
Beard.103 
Apple Barrel Productions, Inc (hereinafter “Apple Barrel”) and 
R.D. Beard (hereinafter “Beard”) were both producers of country 
music programs.104  Apple Barrel claimed that Beard’s performance 
violated Apple Barrel’s copyright because the performance was 
virtually identical to the show Apple Beard produced.105  The district 
court denied Apple Barrel’s motion for a preliminary injunction.106  For 
 
100 See Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, H.R. 357, 109th Cong. (2005). 
101 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1206-07.  It is important to note that in most cases pre-
registration is not useful.  See Preregister Your Work, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.cop 
yright.gov/prereg (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).  The only two scenarios where preregistration 
is useful are where a copyright holder believes his or her work will be infringed before it is 
published and where the copyright holder has started the work but has not finished it.  Id.  Even 
in cases where a copyright holder preregisters, the work must be registered after the work is 
published.  Id.  This shows that registration is still important to Congress.  Id.  See also Brief 
for the United States as amicus curiae, Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (No. 17-571), 2018 WL 2264108, at 17 [hereinafter “Brief for 
the United States”].  
102 Interestingly enough, the court held that the March 10 letter would usually have been 
enough to prove registration and survive a motion to dismiss.  However, La Resolana did not 
challenge the district court’s finding that the letter was unauthenticated hearsay.  See La 
Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1208.  As a result, the court was forced to accept the fact that registration 
had not occurred. 
103 Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir. 1984). 
104 Id. at 386. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  The district court denied the preliminary injunction because the court believed that 
Apple Barrel did not establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.  Id. 
16
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the purposes of this Note, the only relevant holding of this case is that 
Apple Barrel had standing to bring the claim even though the 
Copyright Office had not ruled on Apple Barrel’s application.107  The 
court stated that Apple Barrel only needed to deposit the appropriate 
material, submit an application, and pay the fee to file a copyright 
infringement suit with the court.108  
The court based its decision heavily on arguments set forth by 
Nimmer in his treatise on Copyright.109  However, Nimmer’s supposed 
endorsement of the application approach is misleading.  In reality, 
Nimmer does not support the application approach but instead prefers 
a harmonized approach that takes elements from both legal theories.110  
Nimmer argues that when cases arise that involve complex matters of 
copyrightability, courts should “stay proceedings to allow the 
Copyright Office to weigh in with its special expertise regarding 
copyrightability of plaintiff’s work.”111 
Furthermore, Nimmer bases most of his reasoning on public 
policy as opposed to statutory text.112  This is highlighted by Patry’s 
criticism of Nimmer: “No analysis of the language of the statute or its 
purpose was undertaken.”113  While public policy may be important, 
Nimmer’s treatise says next to nothing about the actual meaning of the 
text of section 411(a).  It is up to the courts to adjudicate and interpret 
law, not legislate it.  The court needs to apply the law as it is written; 
it is not within the court’s authority to reinvent what it means to register 
a copyright.  Patry laments that “[i]t is a sad day when courts ignore 
the statutory scheme and the views of the agency that drafted the 
provision in question in order to make their own policy.”114 
It took twenty-five years after Apple Barrel for another circuit 
to endorse the application approach.  This endorsement can be found 
 
107 Id. 
108 Apple Barrel, 730 F.2d at 386-87. 
109 Id.; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS, supra note 4, § 7.16[B][1][a]. 
110 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS, supra note 4, § 7.16[B][3][b][vi].   
111 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS, supra note 4, § 7.16[B][3][b][vi].  Nimmer explains that cases 
involving complex matters of copyrightability can arise in a wide spectrum of cases.  Id.  For 
example, a complex matter of copyrightability could come up in cases involving geometric 
shapes or “elastomeric filaments radiating from a core.”  Id.  In these cases, Nimmer argues 
that the issue of copyrightability is best handled by the Copyright Office, “particularly to a 
judge lacking previous exposure to higher copyright doctrine.”  Id. 
112 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10. 
113 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10. 
114 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10. 
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in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp,115 where Cosmetic 
Ideas, Inc. (hereinafter “Cosmetic”) created a piece of costume jewelry 
in 1997 and began to sell it in 1999.116  Somewhere between 2005 and 
2008, IAC/InteractiveCorp., Home Shopping Network, Inc., HSN LP, 
and HSN General Partner LLC (collectively, hereinafter “HSN”) 
began to sell an allegedly virtually identical piece of jewelry.117  
Cosmetic filed an infringement suit after submitting its application to 
the Copyright Office but before receiving acceptance or rejection from 
the Copyright Office.118  The district court granted HSN’s motion to 
dismiss, noting that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear the case because the Copyright Office had not yet ruled on 
Cosmetic’s copyright application.119 
The court first focused on the statutory language of the 
Copyright Act.120  However, unlike most other courts, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that the statutory language was ambiguous.121  The court stated 
that “[w]e are not persuaded that the plain language of the Act 
unequivocally supports either the registration or application 
approach.”122  As a result, the court turned to public policy.123 
The court concluded that the application approach fulfilled 
Congress’s goal of providing copyright protection while maintaining a 
robust federal register.124  The court observed that the application 
approach prevented a party from being in legal limbo because the party 
was able to sue for infringement regardless of whether the Copyright 
Office accepted or rejected the copyright application.125  The 
application approach allows the applicant to sue after the submission 
of the application and deposit of the appropriate materials.126 
 
115 606 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010). 
116 Id. at 614. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Notably, the district court granted the motion to dismiss based on the fact that there was 
no subject matter jurisdiction.  However, this was an incorrect conclusion as it went against 
the decision made in Reed Elsevier.  However, the Ninth Circuit did not stop its analysis and 
continued on. 
120 Cosmetic, 606 F.3d at 618. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 619. 
125 Cosmetic, 606 F.3d at 619. 
126 Id. at 620. 
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Second, the court reasoned that the application approach 
encouraged registration because the copyright holder still needed to 
apply for registration of a copyright before initiating a claim for 
infringement.127  Third, the court stated that the registration approach 
was simply a needless formality that the Copyright Act of 1976 was 
intended to eliminate.128  Fourth, the court explained that the possibility 
of a delay caused by the Copyright Office could cause a party to lose 
its ability to sue because of the three-year statute of limitations.129  
Lastly, the court held that it made no sense to defer to the Copyright 
Office when the “decision of whether or not to grant a registration 
certificate is largely perfunctory, and is ultimately reviewable by the 
courts.”130  As a result, the court reversed and remanded the case back 
to the district court for further proceedings.131  
The decision in Cosmetic Ideas ignored key statutory 
provisions and legislative history.  The court lamented that there were 
possible scenarios where the statute of limitations would prevent 
someone from bringing an infringement suit.132  However, as will be 
discussed in Part V of this Note, the Copyright Office is already 
prepared to deal with these scenarios.133  For example, the Copyright 
Office provides an avenue of relief for those litigants who wait until 
the very last moment to file for copyright registration.  For a small fee, 
the copyright application can be expedited and processed in five 
business days.134  Furthermore, while the court called the registration 
requirement a needless requirement, it ignored the fact that Congress 
has consistently retained the registration requirement when amending 
the Copyright Act. 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 620-21.   
130 Cosmetic, 606 F.3d at 621. 
131 Id. at 622. 
132 Id. at 620. 
133 See discussion of Copyright Office infra Part V. 
134 See CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, No. CV 2:16-CV-01762, 2016 WL 4425192, at *5 (S.D.W. 
Va. Aug. 18, 2016), vacated, 318 F.R.D. 582 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 12, 2016) (vacating an order 
because the plaintiff was entitled to amend the complaint).  This expedited process protects 
litigants who are dangerously close to missing the three-year statute of limitations period.  
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IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN FOURTH ESTATE 
In Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
the Eleventh Circuit endorsed the registration approach and deepened 
the circuit split.135  Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation 
(hereinafter “Fourth Estate”) is an organization that produces news 
articles and licenses them to other companies to use, and Wall-
Street.com, LLC (hereinafter “Wall-Street”) is a news website.136  
Wall-Street entered into a licensing agreement with Fourth Estate that 
required Wall-Street to take down the licensed news articles from 
Fourth Estate if it cancelled its account with Fourth Estate because 
Fourth Estate retained the copyright in the articles.137  After Wall-
Street cancelled its account, it did not take down the news articles.138 
As a result, Fourth Estate initiated a copyright infringement 
claim against Wall-Street and its owner, Jerrold Burden.139  Fourth 
Estate’s complaint alleged that it submitted the appropriate registration 
materials to the Copyright Office.140  However, the Copyright Office 
had not yet ruled on Fourth Estate’s copyright application.141  Wall-
Street moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Fourth Estate did 
not satisfy the registration requirement set forth in § 411(a).142  
A. The District Court 
The District Court agreed with Wall-Street and dismissed 
Fourth Estate’s complaint without prejudice.143  Judge Scola, Jr. 
reasoned that “because a plaintiff must first obtain registration for the 
work at issue prior to initiating suit, the Court must dismiss Fourth 
Estate’s claims for copyright infringement.”144  Fourth Estate 
subsequently appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing 
 
135 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10. 
136 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th 
Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018). 
137 Id. at 1339. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1339. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. (citing the district judge in Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 2016 
WL 9045625, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2016)). 
144 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, No. 16-60497-CIV, 2016 WL 
9045625, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2016). 
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that it satisfied the registration requirement set forth in section 
411(a).145 
B. The Eleventh Circuit 
In its appeal, Fourth Estate argued that, even though there was 
previous case law146 in the Eleventh Circuit on the matter of 
registration, the case law was not binding because of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick.147  Fourth Estate 
contended that the decision in Reed Elsevier eroded the rationale used 
to justify past Eleventh Circuit decisions.148  On the other hand, Wall-
Street argued that the Eleventh Circuit should be bound by its previous 
decisions.149 
After discussing the circuit split,150 the Eleventh Circuit bluntly 
stated that filing a simple copyright application did not satisfy 
registration.151  The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the statutory 
language of the Copyright Act.152  The court first examined the 
statutory language of section 410(a).153  In particular, the court 
reasoned that the fact that registration occurs only “after examination 
of an application necessarily means that registration occurs ‘[l]ater in 
time than’ or ‘subsequent to’ the filing of the application for 
 
145 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1339. 
146 See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that a lawsuit cannot be initiated until plaintiff has a registered copyright); see also 
Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1302 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that the Eleventh 
Circuit adopted the registration approach in M.G.B. Homes). 
147 559 U.S. 154, 169 (2010). 
148 The Reed Elsevier case established that registration of a copyright pursuant to section 
411(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement.  See id.  Fourth Estate contended that since previous 
case law in the circuit held that the registration requirement was a jurisdictional limitation, 
these cases should be ignored.  See Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341.  However, the registration 
requirement is still a procedural precondition.  See Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 157 (stating that 
the registration requirement is a precondition to filing a claim). 
149 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1340. 
150 The court stated that the Eighth Circuit supported the application approach in its dicta, 
the Seventh Circuit had conflicting case law, and the First and Second Circuits acknowledged 
the split, but refused to adopt either approach.  Id.; see also Action Tapes, Inc. v. Mattson, 462 
F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006); compare Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 
631 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring that an application be submitted before a copyright infringement 
suit can occur), with Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(stating that the copyright application must be granted or refused before a suit can be brought).  
151 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
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registration.”154  Furthermore, the court stated that section 410(b) gives 
the Copyright Office the power to reject copyright registration.155  The 
court then posited that if simply depositing material satisfied 
registration, then the Copyright Office would have no power to refuse 
registration.156 
The Eleventh Circuit was correct here.  A proper reading of a 
statute requires that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, 
void, or insignificant.157  If the application approach was adopted, the 
power given to the Copyright Office by section 410(b) would be 
meaningless.  The Copyright Office could not refuse registration if 
registration was accomplished on mere application. 
The court then addressed Fourth Estate’s argument that section 
408(a) supported the application approach.158  The court swiftly 
rejected this argument by stating that section 408(a) dealt with the 
conditions required to potentially obtain registration.159  The section 
has nothing to do with the timing of registration or the responsibilities 
of the Copyright Office.160  Finally, the court stated that contrary to 
Fourth Estate’s argument, section 410(d) supported the registration 
approach.161  While section 410(d) states that the effective date of 
registration is when the appropriate material was deposited, it also 
makes clear that registration occurs after the Copyright Office 
accepted the application.162  Section 410(d) is yet another example of 
registration occurring only after examination by the Copyright Office. 
After detailing the consistent statutory support for the 
registration approach, the court considered Fourth Estate’s other 
arguments.163  The first argument dealt with the three-year statute of 
limitations stated in 17 U.S.C. § 507.164  Fourth Estate argued that 
 
154 Id. (alteration and emphasis in original). 
155 Id. 
156 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341. 
157 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). 
158 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341. 
159 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C § 408(a) (2018) (providing that a deposit of the work is one of the 
requirements to potentially obtain registration); see also 17 U.S.C. § 409 (detailing the 
information required for the copyright application); see also 17 U.S.C. § 708 (requiring that a 
fee be sent with the deposit and application in order to potentially obtain registration). 
160 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 1342. 
163 Id. 
164 The statute states that no civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this 
title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued. 
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because the statute of limitations is only three years, it would be 
harmful to potential litigants to have to wait for the Copyright Office 
to accept or reject their application.165  However, the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected this position by stating that the statute of limitations was just 
another method that Congress used to incentivize registration.166  The 
short statutory period fits the statutory scheme that encourages 
registration of a copyright.  Support for incentivizing registration can 
also be found elsewhere in the Copyright Act.167  
The court highlighted 17 U.S.C. § 410(c), which states, “[i]n 
any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or 
within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts 
stated in the certificate.”168  This is yet another example of Congress’s 
encouraging prompt registration of a copyright.  
The court ended its analysis by declining to address Fourth 
Estate’s arguments of legislative history and public policy.169  The 
court succinctly reasoned that if the legislative command was 
straightforward, there was no need to go into the legislative history to 
cloud a statutory text.170  In certain cases, the statutory text can be 
enough.  The decision by the Eleventh Circuit was a strong defense of 
the registration approach.  The Eleventh Circuit held that the statutory 
text of the Copyright Act clearly stated that registration is only satisfied 
after the Copyright Office ruled on the copyright application.171  As a 
result, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Fourth Estate’s 
complaint.172 
 
165 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1342. 
166 Id.  See also discussion of statute of limitations infra Part V. 
167 See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1204 (10th 
Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 
(2010) (stating that every remedy outlined in the Copyright Act is conditioned upon a 
copyright owner’s obtaining registration); see also 17 U.S.C. § 502 (stating that a registrant 
can obtain an injunction); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (stating that a prevailing copyright owner can 
recover attorney’s fees). 
168 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 
169 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1342. 
170 Id.  If the court delved into the legislative history of the Copyright Act, it would have 
come down even more strongly on the side of the registration approach.  Some of the most 
persuasive arguments favoring the registration approach come from the legislative history.  
See discussion of legislative history supra Part II and infra Part V. 
171 Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1342. 
172 Id. 
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The court used the appropriate statutory sections to support the 
registration approach.  One of the strongest parts of the court’s analysis 
involved the statute of limitations.  The court correctly identified 
section 507(b) as yet another incentive created by Congress to 
encourage early registration.173  However, to strengthen its position, 
the court should have discussed that for a small fee, the Copyright 
Office will expedite an application.174  This shows that if there is a need 
for urgency, the Copyright Office is able to decide the matter in five 
business days.175  Moreover, if this solution is not enough, proponents 
of the application approach should lobby Congress to provide an 
exception for those who wait until the end of the statutory provision.  
It is up to Congress, not the courts, to legislate. 
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit should have analyzed the 
legislative history and public policy that supported the registration 
approach.  Even though it is evident from the statutory language of the 
Copyright Act that registration is only satisfied by action by the 
Copyright Office, it is still important that the courts interpret the 
legislative history and analyze public policy.  It would have made an 
already strong case for the registration approach even more persuasive.  
If the Supreme Court finds the statutory language ambiguous, the next 
step of statutory analysis will involve legislative history.  There is 
ample support for the registration approach in the legislative history 
and public policy.176 
V. WHY THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT 
A. In Pari Materia 
The Eleventh Circuit’s focus on the statutory text of the 
Copyright Act should be the baseline from which the Supreme Court 
begins.  When interpreting a statutory text, it is vital to first examine 
the statutory language.177  Here, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed each 
 
173 Id. (stating that the three-year statute of limitations in § 507(b) encourages prompt 
registration).  
174 See 37 C.F.R. § 201.3(d)(7) (2018) (stating that the special handling fee is $800). 
175 See CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, No. CV 2:16-CV-01762, 2016 WL 4425192, at *5 (S.D.W. 
Va. Aug. 18, 2016), vacated, 318 F.R.D. 582 (S.D.W. Va. 2016) (vacating order because the 
plaintiff was entitled to amend the complaint). 
176 See discussion of legislative history supra Part II and infra Part V. 
177 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (stating that the first step in 
statutory construction is examination of the language of the statute); see also Kingdomware 
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statutory section that is pertinent to the registration debate.  The court, 
much like the Tenth Circuit in La Resolana, reasoned that when the 
statutory sections are read in pari materia, a coherent line of logic is 
formed that dictates that registration is only satisfied when the 
Copyright Office acts affirmatively.178 
Sections 410(a) and 410(b) give the Copyright Office the 
explicit power of registration.179 An applicant must first deposit his 
work, application, and fee with the Copyright Office.180  After this, the 
Copyright Office will examine the deposited material and issue either 
an acceptance or rejection.181  This is the role that Congress, via the 
Copyright Act, explicitly delegated to the Copyright Office.182  The 
registration approach allows the Copyright Office to exercise its full 
power granted by Congress.  
B. Legislative History 
However, even if the Supreme Court finds the statutory 
language to be unclear, the registration approach is thoroughly 
supported by legislative history.  The Copyright Act of 1909183 
included a registration requirement similar to that of the Copyright Act 
of 1976.  The Copyright Act of 1909 required that “[n]o action or 
proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in any 
work until the provisions of this Act with respect to the deposit of 
copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with.”184  
Courts consistently held that under the Copyright Act of 1909, an 
infringement suit can only be brought after a certificate of registration 
was obtained.185  This requirement was kept in the Copyright Act of 
1976 over sixty years later. 
 
Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (stating that statutory construction 
starts with the language of the statute). 
178 See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th 
Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 
(2010); 
179 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2018); Id. § 410(b). 
180 § 410(a). 
181 § 410(b). 
182 § 410(a). 
183 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (1909). 
184 Id.  See also Brief for the United States, supra note 101, at 17. 
185 See Brief for the United States, supra note 101, at 18 (detailing that the Second Circuit 
explained that “the 1909 Act required compliance with statutory provisions governing 
‘“registration of [the] work”’ as well as with those governing ‘“deposit of copies,”’ and that 
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One of the goals of the Copyright Act of 1976 was to eliminate 
formalities surrounding copyrights.186  However, Congress retained the 
requirement that works needed to be registered by the Copyright Office 
before a suit for copyright infringement can be instituted.187  The 
House Report for the Copyright Act of 1976 stated “[t]he first sentence 
of section 411(a) restates the present statutory requirement that 
registration must be made before a suit for copyright infringement is 
instituted.”188 
The report highlighted the importance that Congress placed on 
the registration requirement.  Congress affirmed that the requirement 
was not a formality that it sought to eliminate but was something that 
it intended all applicants to do.  It was a necessary procedural step to 
have the Copyright Office rule on a copyright application before a 
lawsuit could be commenced.  This dedication to the registration 
requirement can also be found when Congress considered the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988.189  As previously discussed, 
the Berne Convention was a set of international rules regarding 
copyright law.190  While Congress exempted foreign works from the 
registration requirement, it kept the stringent requirement that the 
Copyright Office register all domestic works before a lawsuit can be 
commenced.191  This amendment not only brought the United States 
into conformity with the requirements of the Berne Convention, but 
kept the registration requirement of section 411(a).192  The application 
approach seeks to ignore this legislative history under the guise of 
public policy. 
This dedication to the registration requirement can again be 
seen in 1993 when Congress took up the question of whether to remove 
the registration requirement.193  Congress decided to keep the 
registration requirement in place and rejected the proposal that would 
have removed registration from section 411(a).194  This is yet another 
 
the court could ‘think of no other added condition for “registration” but acceptance by the 
Register.’”). 
186 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4. 
187 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).  See also Brief for the United States, supra note 101, at 18. 
188 H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 157 (1976). 
189 See S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988).   
190 See discussion of the Berne Convention supra Part II.A. 
191 134 CONG. REC. H.29661, 30103 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1988). 
192 Id. 
193 See Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897, 103d Cong. (1993). 
194 Id. 
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example of Congress purposefully upholding the registration 
requirement.  
However, this was not the last time that Congress considered 
the topic of registration.  In 2005, Congress amended section 411(a) to 
include pre-registration in the statute.195  The Copyright Office stated 
that the purpose of pre-registration is “to allow an infringement action 
to be brought before the authorized commercial distribution of a work 
and full registration thereof, and to make it possible, upon full 
registration, for the copyright owner to receive statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees in an infringement action.”196  Not only did this 
amendment keep the registration requirement in place, but it also 
added a subcategory for works that require immediate protection.  The 
2005 amendment is just another example of Congress’s steadfast 
commitment to the registration requirement of section 411(a).  
Furthermore, the application approach would virtually 
eliminate the usefulness of pre-registration.  According to the 
Copyright Office, “[it accepts] preregistration of unpublished works 
that are being prepared for commercial distribution for types of works 
that the Register of Copyrights determined have had a history of pre-
release infringement.”197  If registration was satisfied as soon as the 
appropriate deposit, fee, and application were submitted, there would 
never be a need for pre-registration since a potential suit would never 
be delayed.198  The application approach once again is inconsistent 
with  a specific statutory section. 
C. Public Policy 
The requirement that the Copyright Office must affirmatively 
rule on a copyright application before a lawsuit can commence 
prevents frivolous cases from clogging up the judicial process.  The 
Copyright Office acts as a filter and certifies that only legitimate claims 
reach the courts.199  Moreover, the Copyright Office is a bastion of 
institutional knowledge when it comes to the Copyright Act.  Nimmer 
describes the Copyright Office as “the governmental agency that 
 
195 See Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, H.R. 357, 109th Cong. (2005); 
see 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018). 
196 See Preregister Your Work, supra note 101. 
197 Preregister Your Work, supra note 101. 
198 Brief for the United States, supra note 101, at 17. 
199 Kasunic, supra note 10. 
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possesses special expertise in determining the bounds of copyright 
protection,” which “could be of great value to the court (particularly to 
a judge lacking previous exposure to higher copyright doctrine).”200 
Furthermore, the Copyright Office not only deals with the legal 
and formal requirements of the Copyright Act, but also determines the 
“copyrightability, the appropriateness of the claim or facts stated in 
conjunction with the examination of the deposit, the sufficiency of the 
deposit, and many other statutory or regulatory nuances of 
registration.”201  Then Solicitor General Elena Kagan said it best: 
“Congress evidently intended the Register’s expertise to serve as a 
resource to courts adjudicating copyright claims and contemplated an 
active role for the Register in certain infringement suits.  The Register 
cannot perform those functions when copyright owners do not present 
their works for registration.”202  The application approach deprives 
courts of the legal findings of a highly specialized governmental office 
that deals solely with copyrights.  This denial of the Copyright Office’s 
authority would impact the integrity of the robust registry that 
Congress intended to create. 
The Copyright Office is responsible for scrutinizing each and 
every part of a work to ensure that it is copyrightable.203  As a result, 
the court gives much more deference to copyright claims that are 
registered by the Copyright Office.204  This is a direct result of the 
prima facie validity that results when a copyright is registered within 
five years of publication.205  Moreover, while Congress wanted to 
create a robust registry, it also intended the works to be genuinely 
copyrightable.206  This process allows for not only a robust registry, 
but also a registry that is filled with genuinely copyrightable works.207  
Furthermore, the Copyright Office assigns different rights to 
applicants depending on whether registration is granted or refused.  An 
applicant whose copyright is registered has different statutory rights 
 
200 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 7.16[B][3][b][vi]. 
201 Kasunic, supra note 10, at 319. 
202 Brief for the United States as amicus curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand, Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2009) (No. 08-103), 2009 WL 1601031, at *24. 
203 Kasunic, supra note 10, at 315. 
204 Kasunic, supra note 10, at 322. 
205 Kasunic, supra note 10, at 322. 
206 Kasunic, supra note 10, at 321. 
207 Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Fourth Estate Pub. Ben. Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (No. 17-571), 
2018 WL 5096054, at 8. 
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from one whose copyright application is denied.  Moreover, if the 
application approach were to be followed, courts would be robbing the 
Copyright Office of clear statutory rights in cases that result in refusal.  
Associate Register of Copyrights Robert Kasunic stated:  
In particular, the statute allows the plaintiff who files 
an infringement suit based on a refused application to 
file, only upon notice, on the Register (and under the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Department of Justice) of 
the initiation of the action for infringement and a copy 
of the complaint, and provides the Register with a 
statutory right to intervene in the action for 
infringement.208 
If the application approach were to be followed, there would be 
no need to provide notice to the Copyright Office that a lawsuit is being 
commenced.  This is because the lawsuit would be initiated before the 
Copyright Office rules on the copyright application.  This is yet 
another statutory right that the application approach ignores. 
Critically, allowing the highly specialized Copyright Office to 
affirmatively act on an application before registration is satisfied 
provides little to no delay in the litigation process.  While some courts 
claim that this drags out the litigation process and conflicts with the 
three-year statute of limitations,209 those courts ignore a crucial 
function of the Copyright Office.  As discussed, for a small fee, the 
Copyright Office can expedite the examination of a claim for 
applicants involved in pending or prospective litigation.210  This 
examination is completed within five business days.211  As a result, not 
only is there little-to-no judicial delay, but the Copyright Office is able 
to rule on the application in a timely manner.  This, coupled with the 
relation-back provision of section 410(d), protects the applicant while 
the Copyright Office is making its ruling.  If public policy dictates that 
this is unacceptable, it is up to the constituents to appeal to Congress 
to provide an exemption in certain scenarios. 
If this is truly a problem that plagues potential litigants, it is the 
role of Congress to change the law, not the courts.  In a brief for the 
 
208 Kausnic, supra note 10, at 319. 
209 Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004). 
210 See CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, No. CV 2:16-CV-01762, 2016 WL 4425192, at *5 (S.D.W. 
Va. Aug. 18, 2016), vacated, 318 F.R.D. 582 (S.D.W. Va. 2016) (vacating order because the 
plaintiff was entitled to amend the complaint).; see also 37 C.F.R. 201.3(d)(7). 
211 Id. at 5. 
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United States as amicus curiae, the United States stated that “the text 
of Section 411(a), and of the Copyright Act as a whole, is the best 
indication of the balance between competing objectives that Congress 
sought to draw.  Any adjustment of that balance is properly entrusted 
to Congress rather than to this Court.”212  Whether it was in 1976, 1988, 
1993, or 2005, Congress has taken an active role in addressing 
registration and has repeatedly and intentionally premised the 
commencement of copyright infringement suits on copyright 
registration by the Copyright Office.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The statutory text, legislative history, and public policy make 
it clear that the registration approach is the correct interpretation of the 
Copyright Act.  This approach recognizes the consistent commitment 
by Congress to retain the registration requirement for domestic works.  
All of these sections should be in the forefront of the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the appropriate approach to registration.  The Supreme 
Court should recognize the consistent statutory language and clear 
legislative history and declare that registration is only satisfied after 
the Copyright Office rules on the application.  In addition to being 
consistent with the overall statutory scheme of the Copyright Act, the 
registration approach better promotes the purposes of copyright law.  
Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision and adopt the registration approach as the law of the land.  
 
212 See Brief for the United States, supra note 101, at 22. 
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